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Abstract
Neural networks are powering the deployment of em-
bedded devices and Internet of Things. Applications
range from personal assistants to critical ones such
as self-driving cars. It has been shown recently that
models obtained from neural nets can be trojaned ; an
attacker can then trigger an arbitrary model behavior
facing crafted inputs. This has a critical impact on
the security and reliability of those deployed devices.
We introduce novel algorithms to detect the tam-
pering with deployed models, classifiers in particu-
lar. In the remote interaction setup we consider,
the proposed strategy is to identify markers of the
model input space that are likely to change class if
the model is attacked, allowing a user to detect a
possible tampering. This setup makes our proposal
compatible with a wide range of scenarios, such as
embedded models, or models exposed through pre-
diction APIs. We experiment those tampering detec-
tion algorithms on the canonical MNIST dataset, over
three different types of neural nets, and facing five dif-
ferent attacks (trojaning, quantization, fine-tuning,
compression and watermarking). We then validate
over five large models (VGG16, VGG19, ResNet, Mo-
bileNet, DenseNet) with a state of the art dataset
(VGGFace2), and report results demonstrating the
possibility of an efficient detection of model tamper-
ing.
1 Introduction
Neural network-based models are increasingly embed-
ded into systems that take autonomous decisions in
place of persons, such as in self-driving cars [28,36] or
in robots [16]. The value of those embedded models
is then not only due to the investments for research
and development, but also because of their critical
interaction with their environment. First attacks on
neural-based classifiers [6] aimed at subverting their
predictions, by crafting inputs that are yet still per-
ceived by humans as unmodified. This leads to ques-
tions about the security of applications embedding
them in the real world [17], and more generally initi-
ated the interest of the security community for those
problems [26]. Those adversarial attacks are con-
fined in modifying the data inputs to send to a neu-
ral model. Yet, very recently, other types of attacks
were shown to operate by modifying the model itself,
by embedding information in the model weight matri-
ces. This is the case of new watermarking techniques,
that aim at embedding watermarks into the model,
in order to prove model ownership [19, 23], or of tro-
janing attacks [4, 21] that empowers the attacker to
trigger specific model behaviors.
Figure 1: Illustration of a model tampering and its
impact on the decision boundaries. We use the Ten-
sorFlow playground application for illustration; this
toy dataset is fitted by a three hidden layer neural
network (blue or yellow data inputs must be covered
by their own color, ideally). The weights of solely the
first layer have been modified (by removing −0.1 from
them), to simulate an attack on the model. We ob-
serve slight changes of decision boundaries, that lead
to misclassify some input data. This paper leverages
such misclassifications for detecting the tampering at-
tacks.
The fact that neural network weights are by them-
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selves implicit (i.e., they do not convey explicit be-
havior upon inspection as opposed to the source code
or formal specification of a software component) ex-
pose applications to novel attack surfaces. It is obvi-
ous that those attacks will have increasingly impor-
tant impact in the future, and that the model creators
– such as companies – have a tremendous interest in
preventing the tampering with their models, specially
in embedded applications [28,29].
In this context, we are interested in providing a
first approach to detect the tampering of a neural
network-based model that is deployed on a device by
the model creator. We stress that one can consider as
an attack any action on a model (i.e., on its weights)
that was not performed by the creator or the opera-
tor of that model. To illustrate the practical effect of
the tampering with a model, we present in Figure 1 a
scenario of a fitted model (leftmost image) over two
classes of inputs (blue and yellow dots). After a slight
manipulation of few weights of the model (attack de-
scribed in the Figure caption), we can observe the re-
sulting changes in the model decision boundaries on
the rightmost image. The attack caused a movement
of boundaries, that had the consequence at inference
time to return some erroneous predictions (e.g., blue
inputs in the yellow area are now predicted as part
of the wrong class). Those wrong predictions might
cause safety issues for the end-user, and are thus due
to the attack on the originally deployed model.
1.1 Practical illustration of an attack:
a trojaned classifier
We motivate our work through a practical attack, us-
ing the technique proposed by Liu et al. in [21]. The
goal of the attack is to inject a malicious behaviour
into an original model, that was already trained and
was functional for its original purpose. The technique
consists in generating a trojan trigger, and then to
retrain the model with synthesized datasets in order
to embed that trigger into the model. The trigger
is designed to be added to a benign input, such as
an image, so that this new input triggers a classi-
fication into the class that was targeted by the at-
tacker. This results in a biased classification triggered
on demand, with potentially important security con-
sequences. The model is then made available as an
online service or placed onto a compromised device;
its behavior facing user requests appears legitimate.
The attacker triggers the trojan at will by sending to
the model an input containing the trojan trigger.
A face recognition model, known as the VGG Face
model [27], has been trojaned with the technique
in [21] and made available for download [5] by the
authors of the attack. We access both this model
and its original version. The observed modifications
in the weights do not indicate, a priori, to which ex-
tent the accuracy has been modified (as depicted in
Figure 1 where blue inputs get the orange label and
vice-versa), as neural-based models have highly im-
plicit behaviours. One then has to pass a test dataset
through the classification API to assess the accuracy
change. The authors report an average degradation of
only 2.35% over the original test data, for the VGG
Face trojaned model. In other words, both models
exhibit a highly similar behaviour (i.e., similar clas-
sifications) when facing benign inputs. As a counter-
measure to distinguish both models, an approach is
compute such a variation or, in a more straightfor-
ward approach, to compute hashes of their weights
(or hashes of the memory zone where the model is
mapped) and to compare them [10]. However, this
approach requires a direct access to the model.
Unfortunately, models are not always (easily) ac-
cessible, because of their embedding on IoT like de-
vices for instance, as reported in work by Roux et
al. [29]. This accessibility problem arises in at least in
two contexts of growing popularity: i) if the model is
directly embedded on a device and ii) if the model is
in production on a remote machine and only exposed
through an API. In such cases where the model is
only accessible through its query API, one can think
about a black-box testing approach [7]: it queries the
suspected model with specific inputs, and then com-
pares the outputs (the obtained classification labels)
with those produced by the original model.
In this paper, we study the efficiency of novel black-
box testing approaches. Indeed, while in theory test-
ing the whole model input space would for sure re-
veal any effective tampering, this would require an
impractical amount of requests. For this approach to
be practical, the inputs used for querying the model
shall be chosen wisely. Our core proposal is then to
identify specific inputs whose property is to change
classification as soon as the model is tampered with.
We refer to these crafted inputs as markers. Our
research question is: How to craft sets of markers
for efficient model tampering detection, in a black-
box setup?
2
1.2 Considered setup: black-box in-
teractions
While there exists a wide range of techniques, at
the system or hardware level, to harden the tam-
pering with software stacks on a device (please re-
fer to the Related Work Section), the case of neural
network models is salient. Due to the intrinsic ac-
curacy change of the model accuracy after the attack
(cf Figure 1), we argue that stealthy, lightweight, and
application-level algorithms can be designed in order
to detect attacks on a remotely executed model.
We consider the setup where a challenger, possibly
a company that has deployed the model on its de-
vices, queries a remote device with standard queries
for classifying objects. This is possible through the
standard classification API that the device exposes
for its operation (paper [34] discusses the same query
setup for classification APIs of web-services). To a
query with a given input object (e.g., image, sound
file) is answered (inferred) a class label among the
set of classes the model has been trained for; this
is the nominal operation of a neural classifier. Note
that for maximal applicability, we do not assume that
the device is returning probability vectors along with
classes; such an assumption would make the prob-
lem easier, but also less widely applicable (as it is
known from previous attacks for stealing models that
those probabilities should not be returned, for secu-
rity hardening facing attackers attempts [30,34]).
1.2.1 Contributions
The contributions of this paper are:
(i) to introduce the problem of the tampering detec-
tion of neural networks in the back-box setup, and to
formalize this problem in Section 2.
(ii) to propose three algorithms to address the chal-
lenge of efficient detection, by crafting markers that
serve as attack witnesses. Those are compared to a
strawman approach. Each have their own scope and
efficiency on certain types of neural networks facing
different attacks.
(iii) to extensively experiment those algorithms on
the canonical MNIST dataset, trained on three state
of the art neural network architectures. We do not
only consider the attack of trojaning, but also gen-
eralize to any attempt to modify the weights of the
remote neural network, through actions such as fine-
tuning, compression, quantization, and watermark-
ing. We then validate the efficiency of our approach
over five large public models, designed for image clas-
sification (VGG16, VGG19, ResNet, MobileNet and
DenseNet).
1.2.2 Organization of the paper
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
We first precisely define the black-box interaction
setup in the context of classification, and define the
tampering detection problem in that regard in Sec-
tion 2. The algorithms we propose are presented in
Section 3, before they are experimented with in Sec-
tion 4; the limits of the black-box setup for tamper-
ing detection are also presented in that Section. We
finally review the Related Work in Section 5 and con-
clude in Section 6.
2 Design rationale
2.1 The black-box model observation
setup
We study neural network classifiers, that account for
the largest portion of neural network models. Let
d be the dimensionality of the input (feature) space
X, and C the set of target labels of cardinality n =
|C|. Let M : Rd → C be a classifier model for the
problem1, that takes inputs x ∈ X to produce a label
yˆ ∈ C: M(x) = yˆ.
To precisely define the notion of decision bound-
ary in this context we need the posterior probabil-
ity vector estimated by M: {P(c|x,M), c ∈ C}.
When the context is clear we will omit x and M
to simply write P(c). Note that while internally M
needs to generate this vector to produce its estimate
yˆ = arg maxc∈C(P(c)), we assume a black-box obser-
vation where only yˆ is available to the user.
Definition 1 (Black-box model). The challenger
queries the observed model M with arbitrary inputs
x ∈ X, and gets in return M(x) = yˆ ∈ C.
This setup is strictly more difficult than a popular
setup where the probability vector is made available
to the user (but that can lead to misuses, as shown
in in [34] by “stealing” the remote model).
We now give a definition of the decision boundary
of a model. This definition is adapted from [20] for
the black-box setup.
1By model, we mean the trained model from a deep neu-
ral network architecture, along with its hyper-parameters and
resulting weights.
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Definition 2 (Decision boundary). GivenM, an in-
put x ∈ X is on the decision boundary between classes
if there exists at least two classes ci, cj ∈ C max-
imising the posterior probability: P(ci) = P(cj) =
maxc∈C P(c).
The set of points on decision boundaries defines
a partitioning of input space X into C equivalence
classes, each class containing inputs for which M
predicts the same label.
We can now provide the definition of models distin-
guishability when queried in a black-box setup, based
on the returned labels.
Definition 3 (Models distinguishability). Two mod-
els M and M′ 6=M can be distinguished in a black-
box context if and only if ∃ x ∈ X s.t. M(x) 6=
M′(x).
Note that this implies that their decision bound-
aries are not equivalent on input space X. Con-
versely, two different classifiers that end up through
a training configuration to raise the same decision
boundaries on input space X, with equivalent classes
in each region, are indistinguishable from an observer
in the black-box model.
Indistinguishability is trivially the inability to dis-
tinguish two models. Since it is generally impossible
to test the whole input set X, a restricted but prac-
tical variant is to consider the indistinguishability of
two models with regards to a given set of inputs, α.
We name this variant α-set indistinguishability.
Since we are interested in cases whereM′ is a slight
alteration of the original model M, it is interesting
to quantify their differences over a given set S:
Definition 4 (Difference between models). Given
two models M, M′ and a set S, the difference be-
tweenM andM′ on S is defined as: ∆(M,M′, S) =
1
|S| .
∑
x∈S δ(M(x),M′(x)), with δ(.) = 1 if M(x) 6=
M′(x), 0 otherwise.
In this light, two S-set indistinguishable modelsM
and M′ have by definition ∆(M,M′, S) = 0.
Definition 5 (Model stability). Given an observa-
tion interval in time I = [t0, te], and a model M ob-
served at time t0 (noted Mt0), the model M is stable
if it is indistinguishable from Mt0∀t ∈ I \ t0.
2.2 The problem of tampering detec-
tion
Problem 1 (Tampering detection of a model in the
black-box setup). Detect that model is not stable, ac-
cording to Definition 5.
This means that finding one input x so that
Mt0(x) 6= Mt′(x) is sufficient to solve Problem 1.
Consequently, an optimal algorithm for solving Prob-
lem 1 is an algorithm that provides, for any modelM
to defend, a single input that is guaranteed to see its
classification changed on the attacked modelM′, for
any possible attack.
Since it is very unlikely, due to the current under-
standing of neural networks, to find such an optimal
algorithm, we resort to finding sets of markers (spe-
cific data inputs) whose likelihood to change classifi-
cation is high as soon as the model is tampered with.
Since the challenge is to be often executed, and be
as stealthy as possible, we refine the research ques-
tion: Are there algorithms to produce sensitive and
small marker sets allowing model tampering detec-
tion in the black-box setup? More formally, we seek
algorithms that given a model M find sets of inputs
K ⊂ X of low cost and high sensitivity to attacks:
Definition 6 (Tampering detection metrics).
• Cost: |K|, the number of requests needed to eval-
uate
{M(x),∀x ∈ K}.
• Sensitivity: The probability to detect any model
tampering, namely that at least one input
(marker) of K gets a different label. Formally,
the performance of a set K can be defined as
P(∃x ∈ K s.t. M(x) 6=M′(x),∀M′).
It is easy to see that both metrics are bound by a
tradeoff: the bigger the marker set, the more likely
it contains a marker that will change if the model is
tampered with. We now have a closer look to this
relation.
2.2.1 Cost-sensitivity tradeoff
As stated in the previous Section, we assume in this
paper that the remote model returns the minimal in-
formation, by building our algorithms with solely la-
bels being returned as answers (M(x) ∈ C).
LetM an original model, andM′ a tampered ver-
sion of M. Consider a set of inputs K ⊂ X of car-
dinality (cost) s. Let p = P(M(x) 6= M′(x)) be the
probability that a marker x ∈ K triggers (that is, x
allows the detection of the tampering). In the ex-
periments, we refer to estimations of p as the marker
triggering ratio. Assume that given a model tam-
pering the probabilities of each marker to trigger are
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independent. The overall probability to detect the
tampering by querying with K of size s is the sen-
sitivity c = 1 − (1 − p)s. While the challenger is
tempted to make this probability as high as possible,
he also desires to keep s low to limit the cost of such
an operation, and to remain stealthy.
In general, we assume the challenger first fixes the
desired sensitivity c as a confidence level of his deci-
sions (say for instance 99% confidence, c = .99). It
turns out that one can easily derive the minimum key
size s given p and c:
(1− p)s < 1− c
s× log(1− p) < log(1− c)
s > log(1− c)/log(1− p)
These relations highlight the importance of having a
high marker triggering ratio: there is an exponential
relation between p and s. This relation is illustrated
Figure 2, that relates the key size s, the marker trig-
gering ratio, and the chosen confidence. Please note
the inverted logscale on the y-axis. It shows that for a
constant confidence c = .99 (dashed line), a key com-
posed by markers easily triggered will be small (e.g.,
6 for p = 0.5), while a key composed by markers with
a low trigger ratio will be considerably larger (458 for
p = 0.01 for instance).
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Figure 2: y-axis: Inverse Confidence Level for (i.e.,
probability of failing at) detecting a tampered model,
with the amount of queries on the x-axis, and for a
given marker triggering ratio (indicated on the top
legend).
This short analysis is stressing the importance
of designing efficient algorithms that craft markers
which have a high chance to be misclassified after
the attack; this permits to challenge the model with
less markers.
Finally, let us note that the goal of an attacker, be-
side the successful implementation of his attack (e.g.,
the embedding of the trojan trigger in the method
proposed in [21]), is to have the minimal impact on
the model accuracy for obvious stealthiness reasons
(e.g., the claim for only 2.35% degradation in [21]).
We thus have the classical conflicting interests for the
attacker and the challenger: the challenger hopes for
a noticeable attack in order to detect it more easily,
while the attacker leans towards the perfect attack
leaving no trace at all. This motivates the research
for the crafting of very sensitive markers, in order to
detect even the slightest attacks on a model.
3 Algorithms for the Detection
of Remote Model Tampering
3.1 Reasoning facing black-box model
classifications
Since we aim at leveraging a limited set of marker
queries to challenge the model, and because success
probability is involved, let us introduce notions of
true and false positives for Problem 1. A true positive
refers to a tampered model being detected as such, a
true negative corresponds to the legitimate (original)
model being recognized as original.
3.1.1 False negatives in tampering detection
Regarding the problem of tampering detection in the
black-box setup, a false negative for the detection oc-
curs if an algorithm challenges the model, gets classi-
fications, and concludes that the model has not been
tampered with, while it was actually the case. The
probability of failure that we presented in Figure 2
thus constitutes the probability of false negatives.
3.1.2 False positives in tampering detection
In this setup, assuming that the original model has a
deterministic behaviour, false positives cannot hap-
pen. A false positive would be the detection of an at-
tack that did not occur. Since the challenger had full
control over his model before deployment, he knows
the original labels of his markers. Any change in
those labels is by the problem definition an indica-
tion of the tampering and therefore cannot be misin-
terpreted as an attack that never occurred.
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3.2 The strawman approach and three
algorithms
The purpose of the novel algorithms we are now pre-
senting is to provide the challenger with a key K to
query the remote model, that is composed of a set of
|K| = s input markers. Concretely, given an original
modelM, those algorithms generate a set of markers
K. The owner of the model stores K along with the
response vector YˆM, associated with the markers in
K: YˆM ←M(i),∀i ∈ K.
We assume that K is kept secret (unknown to the
attacker). When the user needs to challenge a poten-
tially attacked model M′, it simply queries M′ with
inputs in K, and compares the obtained response vec-
tor YˆM′ with the stored YˆM. If the two response
vectors differ, the user can conclude that M 6=M′.
The algorithms are designed to operate on widely
different aspects of black-box model querying. Ta-
ble 1 synthesizes the different knowledge exploited
by those algorithms. Cases where the remote model
is accessible (i.e., white-box testing) can be solved
by direct weight comparison or standard software in-
tegrity testing approaches [10], and are not in the
scope of this paper.
SM (standing for strawman) represents an intu-
itive approach, consisting in tracking a sort of ”non-
regression” with regards to the initial model deployed
on devices. The GRID algorithm (grid-like inputs) is
also model agnostic, as it generates inputs at ran-
dom, that are expected to be distant from real-data
distribution, and then to assess boundary changes in
an efficient way. Both WGHT (perturbation of weights)
and BADV (boundary adversarial examples) take as ar-
guments the model to consider, and a value ; the for-
mer applies a random perturbation on every weight to
observe which are the most sensitive inputs with re-
gards to misclassification after the attack (in the hope
that those inputs will also be sensitive to forthcoming
attacks). The latter generates adversarial inputs by
the decision boundaries, in the hope to be sensitive
to their movements. We now give their individual
rationale in the following subsections, and present in
Figure 3 an illustration.
3.2.1 The strawman approach (SM)
This strawman approach uses inputs from the test
set as markers in order to assess changes in classifi-
cation. An initial classification is performed for the
markers before model deployment, and the resulting
classes are expected to remain identical in subsequent
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: The placement of markers by the four algo-
rithms. SM (a) picks a fraction of the test set inputs
as markers; their position are thus related to the po-
sition of the dataset inputs. GRID (b) places markers
at random corners of the d dimensional hyper-cube
delimiting the input space. WGHT (c) finds inputs of
the test set that are sensitive to weight perturbations,
to select them as markers. Finally, BADV (d) converts
test set inputs into adversaries located nearby the
boundaries.
Algorithm 1: SM
Input: A test set T ; s
1 for 0 to s do
2 K.append(T [random int(|T |)]))
3 end
4 return K
queries.
Algorithm 1 then simply returns a key of size s,
from the random selection of inputs in the provided
test set T .
3.2.2 Grid-like inputs (GRID)
This algorithm generates markers independently of
the model M that is to be challenged.
Most generally, in classification tasks, the inputs
are normalized before their usage to train the model.
Without loss of generality for a normalization out
of the [0, 1] range, for each of the d dimensions of
the considered model (e.g., the 784 dimensions of a
MNIST image), Algorithm 2 sets a random bit. The
rationale is to generate markers that are far apart the
6
Remote Opacity Black-Box White-Box
Original Opacity Black-Box White-Box
Knowledge Required Input format A bunch of inputs Original weights Original architecture Remote weights
Algorithm GRID SM WGHT BADV –
Table 1: Summary of Algorithm requirements, ordered by the amount of knowledge required for the challenge.
Algorithm 2: GRID
Input: Image width x and height y; s
1 for 0 to s do
2 for 0 to x do
3 for 0 to y do
4 img[x][y]← random bit()
5 end
6 end
7 K.append(img)
8 end
9 return K
actual probability distribution of the base dataset:
since the training and tampering with M are willing
to preserve accuracy, constraints are placed on mini-
mizing test set misclassification. The consequence is
a large degree of freedom for decision boundaries that
are far apart the mass of inputs from the training set.
We thus expect those crafted inputs to be very sen-
sitive to the movement of boundaries resulting from
the attack.
3.2.3 Perturbation of weights (WGHT)
The WGHT algorithm takes as arguments the model
M, and a value . It observes the classifications of
inputs in dataset T , before and after a perturbation
has been applied to all weights of M (i.e., a random
perturbation of every weight to up to ±). Inputs for
which label have changed, due to this form of tamper-
ing, are sampled to populate key K. The rationale
is that with a low , the key markers are expected
to be very sensitive to the tampering of model M.
In other words, inputs from K are expected to be
the most sensitive inputs from T when it comes to
tamper with the weights of M.
3.2.4 Boundary adversarial examples (BADV)
Adversarial examples have been introduced in the
early works presented in [6] and re-framed in [33], in
order to fool a classifier (by making it misclassify in-
puts) solely due to slight modifications of the inputs.
Goodfellow et al. then proposed [11] an attack for
Algorithm 3: WGHT
Input: A test set T ; a modelM; a small ; s
1 for i← 0 to |T | do
2 pre.append(M(i))
3 end
4 for i← 0 to |get weights(M)| do
5 M.set weight(i,M.get weight(i) +
random float(−,+))
6 end
7 for i← 0 to |T | do
8 post.append(M(i))
9 end
10 for i← 0 to s do
11 if pre(i) 6= post(i) then
12 K.append(pre(i))
13 if |K| = s then
14 break;
15 end
/* Assumes |K| = s, increase  otherwise */
16 return K
Algorithm 4: BADV
Input: A test set T ; a modelM; an attack A; a
small ; s
1 for i← 0 to |T | do
2 adv.append(A(M(i), ))
3 if M(i) 6=M(adv) then
4 K.append(adv)
5 if |K| = s then
6 break;
7 end
/* Assumes |K| = s, increase  otherwise */
applying perturbations to inputs that leads to vast
misclassifications of the provided inputs (that attack
is named the fast gradient sign attack or FGSM ).
Those crafted inputs yet appear very similar to the
original ones to humans, which leads to important
security concerns [28]; note that since then, many
other attacks of that form were proposed (even based
on different setup assumptions [24]), as well as plat-
forms to generate them (e.g., [1] or [2]).
We propose with BADV to leverage the FGSM at-
tack, but in an adapted way. The FGSM attack
adds the following quantity to a legitimate input x:
 × sign(OxJ(M, x, y)), with Ox being the gradient
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of J (the cost function used to train model M), and
y the label of input x.  captures the intensity of the
attack on the input. Approach in [11] is interested in
choosing an  that is large enough so that most of the
inputs in the batch provided to the FGSM algorithm
are misclassified (e.g.,  = 0.25 leads to the misclas-
sification of 97.5% of the MNIST test set). We are
instead interested in choosing an  that is sufficient
to create s misclassified markers only; the rationale is
that the lower the , the closer the crafted inputs are
to the decision boundary; our hypothesis is that this
proximity will make those inputs very sensitive to any
attack of the model that will even slightly modify the
position of decision boundaries. In practice, and with
Algorithm 4, we start from a low , and increase it
until we get the desired key length s.
4 Experimental Evaluation
This section is structured as follows: we first describe
the experiments on MNIST (along with the consid-
ered attacks and parameters for algorithms). We then
discuss and experiment the limitations of the black-
box setup we considered. We finally validate our take-
aways on five large image classification models, in the
last subsection of this evaluation.
We conduct experiments using the TensorFlow
platform, using the Keras library.
4.1 Three neural networks for the
MNIST dataset
The dataset used for those extensive experiments is
the canonical MNIST database of handwritten digits,
that consists of 60, 000 images as the training set, and
of 10, 000 for the test set. The purpose of the neural
networks we trained are of classifying images into one
of the ten classes of the dataset.
The three off-the-shelf neural network architec-
tures we use are available on the Keras website [3],
namely as mnist mlp (0.984% accuracy at 10 epochs),
mnist cnn (0.993% at 10) and mnist irnn (0 .9918%
at 900). We rename those into MLP, CNN and IRNN
respectively. They constitute different characteristic
architectures, with one historical multi-layer percep-
tron, a network with convolutional layers, and finally
a network with recurrent units.
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Figure 4: Performance results of the proposed algo-
rithms (GRID, WGHT and BADV), with regards to the
strawman approach (SM). Attacks applied to the mod-
els (listed on top) are indicated on the y-axis, while
the ratio of triggered markers is indicated on the
x-axis. Average results, as well as standard devia-
tions for the algorithms are presented, the rightmost
the better for their performance. For instance the
WGHT algorithm, facing the fine-tuning attack, sees
half of its key markers being triggered, while only one
marker (ratio of 1/100) is triggered for the strawman
approach.
4.2 Attacks: from quantization to tro-
janing
This subsection lists the five attacks we considered.
Excluding the watermarking and trojaning attacks,
the others are standard operations over trained mod-
els; yet if an operator has already deployed its models
on devices, any of those can be considered as attacks,
as they tamper with the model that was designed for
a precise purpose.
4.2.1 Quantization attack
This operation aims at reducing the number of bits
representing each weight in the trained model. It
is in practice widely used prior to deployment in
order to fit the architecture and constraints of the
target device. TensorFlow by default uses 32-bit
floating points, and the goal is convert the model
into 8-bit integers for instance. The TensorFlow
fake quant with min max args function is used to
simulate the quantization of the trained neural net-
work. We kept the default parameters of that func-
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tion (8-bits quantization, with -6 to 6 as clamping
range for the input).
4.2.2 Compression attack
A form of compression is flooring ; it consists in set-
ting to zero all model weights that are below a fixed
threshold, and aims at saving storage space for the
model. We set the following threshold value for the
three networks: 0.0727, 0.050735 and 0.341 for the
MLP, CNN and IRNN networks respectively. Those
thresholds cause the degradation of network accura-
cies by about one percent (accuracies after the com-
pression are 0.9749, 0.9829 and 0.9821, respectively).
4.2.3 Fine-tuning attack
Its consists in starting from a trained model, and to
re-train it over a small batch of new data. This results
in model weight changes, as the model was adapted
through back-propagation to prediction errors made
on that batch. We used a random sample of 300
inputs from the MNIST test set for that purpose.
4.2.4 Watermarking attack
Watermarking techniques [19,23] embed information
into the target model weights in order to mark its
provenance. Since work in [19] operated on the
MNIST dataset, and provided detailed parameters,
we implemented this watermarking technique on the
same models (MLP, CNN, and IRNN). The water-
mark insertion proceeds by fine-tuning the model over
adversarial examples to re-integrate them into their
original class, in order to obtain specific classifica-
tions for specific input queries (thus constituting a
watermark). This approach requires a parameter for
the mark that we set to 0.1, consistently with remarks
made in [19] for maintaining the watermarked model
accuracy.
4.2.5 Trojaning attack
We leverage the code provided in a GitHub reposi-
tory, under the name of Stux-DNN, and that aims
at trojaning a convolutional neural network for the
MNIST dataset [4]. We first train the provided orig-
inal model, and obtain an accuracy of 93.97% over
the MNIST test set. The trojaning is also achieved
with the provided code.
After applying those five attacks, the models ac-
curacies changed; those are summarized on Table 2.
MLP CNN (Stux) IRNN
Original model accuracy 0.9849 0.9932 (0.9397†) 0.9919
Quantization 0.9851 0.9928 0.9916
Flooring 0.9749 0.9829 0.9821
Fine-tuning 0.9754 0.9799 0.9917
Watermarking [19] 0.9748 0.9886 0.9915
Trojaning L0 [4] - (0.9340†) -
Trojaning mask [4] - (0.9369†) -
Table 2: Original model accuraries (white row), and
accuracies resulting from attacks (grey rows). The
lower the loss in accuracy, the stealthier the attack.
Values marked † are obtained on the trojaned CNN
model introduced in [4], and publicly available on the
authors website.
Note that some attacks may surprisingly result in a
slight accuracy improvement, as this is the case for
MLP and quantization.
4.3 Algorithms settings
4.3.1 Settings for SM
SM uses a sample of images from the original MNIST
test set, selected at random.
4.3.2 Settings for GRID
We use the Python Numpy uniform random genera-
tor for populating markers, that are images of 28x28
pixels.
4.3.3 Settings for WGHT
All the weights in the model are perturbed by adding
to each of them a random float within [−0.07,+0.07],
[−0.07,+0.07] or [−0.245,+0.245] for the MLP, CNN
and IRNN architectures respectively. This operation
must keep the accuracy loss within a small percent-
age, while making it possible to cause enough classifi-
cation changes for populatingK (those values allowed
to identify just over 100 markers).
4.3.4 Settings for BADV
For generating adversarial examples that are part of
the key, we leverage the Cleverhans Python library
[1]. The FGSM algorithm used in BADV, requires the
 parameter for the perturbation of inputs to (i) be
small enough, and (ii) allow for the generation at
least 200 adversarial examples out of 10, 000 files in
the test set.  is set to 0.04, 0.08 and 0.14 for the
MLP, CNN and IRNN networks.
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4.4 Experimental results
Results are presented in Figure 4, for all the attacks
(excluding the trojaning attack), the three models
and the four algorithms. We set key size s = 100;
each experiment is executed 10 times.
SM generates markers that trigger with a proba-
bility below 0.02 for all attacks and all models; this
means that some attacks such as for instance quanti-
zation over the MLP or IRNN models remain unde-
tected after 100 query challenges.
All three proposed algorithms significantly beat
that strawman approach; the most efficient algo-
rithm, on average and in relative top-performances
is BADV. Most notably, on the IRNN model it man-
ages to trigger a ratio of up to 0.791 of markers, that
is around 80% of them, for the flooring attack. This
validates the intuition that creating sensitive mark-
ers from adversarial examples by the boundary (i.e.,
with small  values) is possible.
The third observation is that GRID arrives in second
position for general performances: this simple algo-
rithm, that operates solely on the data input space
for generating markers, manages to be sensitive to
boundary movements.
The WGHT algorithm has high performance peaks for
the MLP model, with up to half of triggered mark-
ers for the fine-tuning attack, and a ratio of 0.385
for flooring (i.e., more than one third of markers
are triggered); it has the lowest performances of the
three proposed algorithms, specifically for the IRNN
model. This may come from the functioning of its
recurrent architecture that makes it more robust to
direct perturbations of weights: the model is more
stable during learning (it requires around 900 epochs
to be trained, while the two other models need only
10 epochs to reach their peak accuracy).
The watermark attack is very well detected on the
IRNN model with the BADV algorithm (ratio of 0.86),
on an equivalent rate on three models by GRID, while
SM still shows trace amount of markers triggered for
MLP and CNN, and none for IRNN.
Considering the relatively low degradation of the
models reported on Table 2 (i.e., within around 1%
maximum)2, we conclude that all three proposed al-
gorithms capture efficiently the effects of even small
attacks on the models to be defended, while SM
would only be valuable in cases of large degradation
of models. We illustrate in the subsection 4.6 the
2Trojaning attacks in [21] reports degradation over the orig-
inal models of 2.60% (VGG Face recognition), 3% (speech
recognition) or 3.50% (speech altitude recognition).
degradation-detectability trade-off.
Euclidean Distance
Accuracy Loss
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Figure 5: Applying a compression (flooring) attack of
increasing intensity (x-axis). Top-Figure: loss in ac-
curacy of the attacked model, as compared to the
original one. Bottom-Figure: measure of the Eu-
clidean distance between the weights of the original
and attacked models.
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Figure 6: Impact of the same progressive flooring at-
tack than in Figure 5 on the ratio of markers triggered
for both SM and WGHT (y-axis, logscale).
4.5 Validation on a trojaning attack
on MNIST
The modified accuracy of the neural network model
proposed by [4], due to the attack, is reported on
Table 2. The attack has two trojaning modes (L0
and mask). We now question the ability of one of
our algorithms to also be outperforming the straw-
man approach SM; we experiment with GRID. Results
are that SM manages to trigger ratios of 0.0524 and
0.0529 of markers, for L0 and mask modes respec-
tively (please refer to their original paper for details
on these techniques). GRID reaches ratios of 0.4560
and 0.4502, that are 8.7x and 8.5x increases in ef-
ficiency. This suggests that for a practical usage, a
small key K of s = 10 will detect the attack, while
SM is likely to raise a false negative.
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4.6 Undetectable attacks and indis-
tinguishably: illustrations
We now present examples that illustrate the inherent
limits of a black-box interaction setup, as defined in
subsection 2.1.
Let’s consider the MLP model, along its best per-
forming algorithm for tamper detection, WGHT. As-
sume that the model is tampered with using com-
pression (flooring), and that we observe successive
attacks: from an attack value (flooring threshold v)
starting at 0, it reaches a value of v = 0.1 by incre-
ments of 0.001 (i.e., at each attack, weights under
v are floored). We observe the results after every
attack; we plot in Figure 5 the loss in accuracy of
the attacked model (top-Figure), and the Euclidean
distance between the original and attacked model
weights (bottom-Figure). For instance, we observe a
30% accuracy loss at a distance of 40. Since the loss
is noticeable from around v = 0.05, we zoom in for
plotting the corresponding ratio of markers triggered
in Figure 6.
Those two figures convey two different observa-
tions, presented in the next two subsections.
4.6.1 Limits of the algorithms and of the
black-box setup
The following cases may happen for attacks that have
a very small impact on the model weights.
• Case 1: Accuracy changed after the attack, but
the algorithm failed in finding at least one input
that has changed class (i.e., no marker from K
has shown a classification change).
• Case 2: We did not manage to find any such
input despite the attack.
Case 1 for instance occurs with v = 0.004, as seen
in Figure 6. This means that both algorithms have
failed, for the chosen key length s, to provide mark-
ers that were present in the zones where boundary
moved due to the attack. (Please remind that, if the
accuracy post attack has been modified, this means
that some inputs from the test set has a changed la-
bel, then indicating that boundaries have de facto
moved).
Case 2 is particularly interesting as it permits to
illustrate Definition 3 in its restricted form: an attack
occurred on M (as witness by a positive Euclidean
distance between the two models in Figure 5), but
it does not result in a measurable accuracy change.
It is α-set indistinguishable, with here α being the
MNIST test set. We measure this case for v = 0.003,
where pre and post accuracies are both 0.9849.
Case 1 motivates the proposal of new algorithms
for the problem. We nevertheless highlight that the
trojan attack [21] degrades the model on a basis
of around 2%, while our algorithm is here unable
to detect a tampering that is two order of magni-
tude smaller (accuracy loss of 0.02% for the attacked
model). This indicate extreme cases for all future
tampering detection approaches. Case 2 questions
the black-box interaction setup. This setup enables
tampering detection in a lightweight and stealthy
fashion, but may cause indecision due to the inability
to conclude on tampering due to the lack of test data
that can assess accuracy changes.
4.6.2 WGHT outperforms SM by nearly two or-
ders of magnitude for small attacks
As observed in Figure 6, the SM markers triggered
ratio ranges from 0.0001 to around 0.005, while for
WGHT it ranges from 0.01 to 0.1, in this extreme case
for attack detection with very low model degradation.
Figure 7 concludes this experiment by presenting
the key size s that is to be chosen, depending on
the algorithm and on the tolerance to attack inten-
sity. This is in direct relation with the efficiency gap
observed on previous figure: the more efficient the al-
gorithm for finding sensitive markers, the smaller the
query key for satisfying the according detection con-
fidence. For an equivalent confidence, the key size to
leverage for SM is 100 times longer than for the WGHT
algorithm, confirming the efficiency of the techniques
we proposed in this paper.
4.7 Validation on five large classifier
models
We conducted extensive experiments on the standard
MNIST dataset for it allows computations to run in
a reasonable amount of time, due to the limited sizes
of both its datasets and of the models for learning
it. In order to validate the general claim of this pa-
per, we now perform experiments on five large and
recent models for image classification, using a state
of the art dataset. This validation is interested in
checking the consistency with the observation from
the MNIST experiments, that have shown that our
algorithms significantly outperform the strawman ap-
proach.
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Figure 7: Key K size s (y-axis) to choose for a given
challenge detection failure (noted confidence, on top-
legend). Lines represent a smoothed average. Intu-
itively, the smaller the failure probability, the larger
the key to select; this is the experimental counterpart
to the analysis in Figure 2. Its size depends on the
chosen algorithm and on the intensity of the flooring
attack (x-axis).
We leverage five open-sourced and pre-trained
models: VGG16 [31] (containing 138,357,544 pa-
rameters, as compared to MNIST models containing
669,706 (MLP), 710,218 (CNN) and 199,434 (IRNN)
parameters), VGG19 [31] (143,667,240 parameters),
ResNet50 [12] (25,636,712 parameters), MobileNet
[14] (4,253,864 parameters) and DenseNet121 [15]
(8,062,504 parameters). Except for the two VGG
variants VGG16 and VGG19, all four architectures
are broadly different models, that each were proposed
as independent improvements for those image classi-
fication tasks (please refer to the Keras site [3] for
each their own characteristics).
The VGGFace2 dataset has been made public re-
cently [8]; it consists of a split of training (8631 la-
bels) and test (500 labels) sets. The labels in the
two sets are disjoint. We consider a random sample
of 10, 000 images of the VGGFace2 test dataset, for
serving as inputs to the SM and WGHT algorithms. We
note that despite that labels in the test set are dif-
ferent from the ones learnt in the models, this is a
classic procedure (used e.g., for experiments in work
by Liu et al. [21]): a neural network with good per-
formances will output stable features for new images,
and thus in our case predict consistently the same
class for each new given input. Those images are im-
ported as 224x224 pixel images to query the tested
models (versus 28x28 for MNIST). As for previous
experiment (Figure 6), we experiment with the SM
and WGHT algorithms and s = 100, with the flooring
attack. We perform the computations on four Nvidia
TESLAs V100 with 32 Gb of RAM each; each setup
is run three times and results are averaged (standard
deviations are presented).
Figure 8 presents the results. The x-axis of each
figure represents the flooring intensity, with the same
values for all models, except for DenseNet because
of its noticeable sensitivity to attacks. VGG16 cor-
responds to the neural network architecture of tro-
janed in paper [21]. For all models, we observe that
an attack of 0.00001 is bellow what both SM and WGHT
can detect (situation presented in Section 4.6). For
the second smaller considered attack values on the
x-axis, only WGHT manages to trigger markers; this
constitutes another evidence that crafted markers are
more sensitive and will trigger first for the smallest
detectable attacks. For all the remaining flooring
parameters, SM triggers markers, but always signif-
icantly less than WGHT (up a factor of 15 times less, at
x = 0.001 on VGG19). All the models exhibit a very
similar trend for both curves. The triggering ratio
in the case of ResNet is lower for both WGHT and SM,
while gap between the two approaches remains simi-
lar. Finally, in the DenseNet case, we note a higher
triggering ratio for SM than for other models on the
last three flooring values; the results are still largely
in favor of the WGHT algorithm.
5 Related Work
Research works targeting the security of embedded
devices such as IoT devices [29], suggest that tra-
ditional security mechanisms must be reconsidered.
Main problems for traditional security tools is the
difficulty to fix software flaws on those devices, the
frequency to which those flows are reported, and fi-
nally their limited resources for the implementation
of efficient protections.
Anti-tampering techniques for traditional software
applications may be applied directly on the host ma-
chine in some defense scenarios. This is the case
for the direct examination of the suspected piece of
software [10]. Remote attestation techniques [9] al-
lows for the distant checking of potential illegitimate
modifications of software or hardware components;
this is nevertheless requiring the deployment of a spe-
cific challenge/response framework (often using cryp-
tographic schemes), that both parties should comply
with. Program result checking (or black-box testing)
is an old technique that inspects the compliance of a
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Figure 8: Marker triggering ratio for five large image classification models. One proposed algorithm (WGHT)
versus the strawman approach (SM), facing the flooring attack. A sample of the VGGFace2 test dataset is
used.
software by observing outputs on some inputs with
expected results [7]; it has been applied in conven-
tional software applications, but not on the particular
case of deep learning models, where the actions are
driven by an interpretation of a model (its weights
in particular) at runtime. In that light, the work
we proposed in this paper is a form of result check-
ing for neural model integrity attestation. Since it is
intractable to iterate over all possible inputs of a neu-
ral network model to fully characterize it (unlike for
reverse engineering finite state machines [35] for in-
stance), due to the dimensionality of inputs in current
applications, the challenger is bound to create some
algorithms to find some specific inputs that will carry
the desired observations.
After a fast improvement of the results provided
by neural network-based learning techniques in the
past years, models found practical deployments into
user devices [18]. The domain of security for those
models is a nascent field [26], following the dis-
covery of several types of attacks. The first one
is the intriguing properties of adversarial attacks
[6, 11, 17, 33] for fooling classifications; a wide range
of proposals are attempting to circumvent those at-
tacks [22, 25, 37]. Counter measures for preventing
the stealing of machine learning models such as neu-
ral networks thought prediction APIs are discussed
in [34]; it includes the recommendation for the service
provider not to send probability vectors along with
labels in online classification services. Some attacks
are willing to leak information about individual data
records that were used during the training of a model
[30,32]; countermeasures are to restrict the precision
of probability vectors returned by the queries, or to
limit those vectors solely to top-k classes [30]. The
possibility to embed information within the models
themselves with watermarking techniques [19, 23] is
being discussed on the watermark removal side by ap-
proaches like [13]. Trojaning attacks [4,21] are yet not
addressed, except by this paper, that introduced the
problem and brought three novel algorithms to detect
the tampering with models in a black-box setup.
6 Conclusion
Neural network-based models enable applications to
reach new levels of quality of service for the end-user.
Those outstanding performances are in balance, fac-
ing the risks that are highlighted by new attacks is-
sued by researchers and practitioners. This paper in-
troduced the problem of tampering detection for re-
motely executed models, by the use of their standard
API for classification. We proposed algorithms that
craft markers to query the model with; the challenger
detects an attack on the remote model by observing
prediction changes on those markers. We have shown
a high level of performance as compared to a straw-
man approach that would use inputs from classic test
sets for that purpose; the challenger can then expect
to detect a tampering with very few queries to the re-
mote model, avoiding false negatives. We believe that
this application-level security checks, that operate at
the model level and then at the granularity of the in-
put data itself, is raising interesting futureworks for
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the community.
While we experimented those algorithms facing
small modifications made to the model by attacks, we
have also shown that below a certain level of modifi-
cation, the black-box setup may not permit to detect
tampering attacks. In other situations, where the at-
tack is observed in practice through accuracy change
in the model, our algorithms can fail in the detection
task. Some even more sensitive approaches might be
proposed in the future. We believe this is an inter-
esting futurework direction, that is to be linked with
the growing understanding of the inner functioning
of neural networks, and on their resilience facing at-
tacks.
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